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Abstract
Privacy preserving machine learning algorithms are crucial for learning models over user data
to protect sensitive information. Motivated by this, differentially private stochastic gradient
descent (SGD) algorithms for training machine learning models have been proposed. At each
step, these algorithms modify the gradients and add noise proportional to the sensitivity of
the modified gradients. Under this framework, we propose AdaCliP, a theoretically-motivated
differentially private SGD algorithm that provably adds less noise compared to the previous
methods, by using coordinate-wise adaptive clipping of the gradient. We empirically demonstrate
that AdaCliP reduces the amount of added noise and produces models with better accuracy.
1 Introduction
Machine learning models are widely deployed in various applications such as image classification [1, 2],
natural language processing [3, 4], and recommendation systems [5]. Most state-of-the-art machine
learning models are trained on user data, examples include keyboard models [6], automatic video
transcription [7] among others. User data often contains sensitive information such as typing
histories, social network data, financial and medical records. Hence releasing such machine learning
models to public requires rigorous privacy guarantees while maintaining the performance.
Of the various privacy mechanisms, differential privacy [8] has emerged as the well accepted
notion of privacy. The notion of differential privacy provides a strong notion of individual privacy
while permitting useful data analysis in machine learning tasks. We refer the reader to [9] for a
survey. Originally used for database queries, it has been adapted to provide privacy guarantees
for machine learning models. Informally, for the output to be differentially private, the estimated
model and all of its parameters should be indistinguishable whether a particular client’s data was
taken into consideration or not.
Differential privacy for machine learning has been studied in various models including models
with convex objectives [10, 11, 12] and more recently deep learning methods [13, 14, 15]. One
particular set of algorithms for learning differentially private machine learning models can be
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interpreted as noisy stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [16, 13, 14]. At each iteration of SGD, these
algorithms modify the gradients suitably to provide differential privacy.
In this paper, we ask if there is a systematic, theoretically motivated, principled approach to
obtain an optimal modification strategy. Motivated by the convergence guarantees of SGD, we
propose a new differentially private SGD algorithm called AdaCliP. Compared to the previous
methods, AdaCliP achieves the same privacy guarantee with much less added noise by using
coordinate-wise adaptive clipping of the gradient. Since the convergence of SGD depends on the
variance of the gradient, this approach improves the learned model quality. We empirically evaluate
the performance of differentially private SGD techniques on MNIST dataset using various machine
learning models, including neural networks. Our experiments show that AdaCliP achieves much
better accuracy than previous methods for the same privacy constraints. We also empirically evaluate
performance of momentum optimization algorithm in place of SGD and show that momentum does
not result in models with better accuracy even though it adds less noise per iteration compared to
SGD. We provide a possible explanation for this counter-intuitive phenomenon in Appendix B.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we overview differential privacy and previous
methods. In Section 3, we motivate the need for a new differentially private SGD method. In
Section 4, we introduce a general formulation that encompasses previous methods and present
Theorem 1 to show the parameters that minimize the amount of noise added. In Section 5, we state
our SGD technique AdaCliP that uses optimal parameters derived in Theorem 1. In Section 6, we
present our empirical results.
Notation. For any vectors u and v, u/v and uv are used to denote element-wise division
and element-wise multiplication respectively. For any vector v ∈ Rd, vi is used to denote the ith
co-ordinate of the vector. For a vector u, ‖u‖ denotes the `2 norm of vector u.
2 Differential privacy for distributed SGD
We first formally describe differential privacy [17] and the previous differentially private SGD
methods. We then motivate the need for a new differentially private SGD algorithm by a simple
example.
2.1 Differential privacy
Let D be a collection of datasets. Two datasets D and D′ are adjacent if they differ in at most one
user data. A mechanismM : D → R with domain D and range R is (, δ)-differentially private if
for any two adjacent datasets D,D′ ∈ D and for any subset of outputs S ⊆ R,
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
If δ = 0, it is referred to as pure differential privacy [9]. The (, δ)- formulation allows for pure
formulation to break down with probability δ. We state our results with (, δ)- privacy formulation,
but it can be easily extended to (, 0) pure differential privacy. A standard paradigm to provide
privacy-preserving approximations to function ϕ : D → Rd is to add noise proportional to the
sensitivity Sϕ of function ϕ, which is formally defined as the maximum of absolute `2 difference
between function values for two adjacent datasets D and D′ i.e.,
Sϕ = max
D,D′∈D
‖ϕ(D)− ϕ(D′)‖.
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One such privacy-preserving approximation is the Gaussian mechanism [9] that adds Gaussian noise
of variance of S2ϕσ2, i.e.,M(D) = ϕ(D) +N (0, S2ϕσ2I), where N (µ,Σ) represents Gaussian variable
with mean µ and covariance matrix Σ. We now present a well-known result [9] that relates noise
scale σ of Gaussian mechanism to parameters  and δ.
Lemma 1. For any  < 1, the Gaussian mechanism with noise scale σ satisfies
(
, 45 exp
(−(σ)2
2
))
-
differential privacy.
Lemma 1 implies various (, δ) pairs for a given noise scale σ. The above definition uses `2
sensitivity. For databases with `1 sensitivity, Laplace noise can be added to obtain pure differential
privacy [9]. Recently the optimal noise distributions to generate the least amount of noise have been
proposed for both (, 0) and (, δ) differential privacy [18, 19].
2.2 Differential privacy for machine learning
Differential privacy definition was originally used to provide strong privacy guarantees for database
querying and since used in several applications [20, 21, 22]. Recently it has been extended to
machine learning formulations. For the context of machine learning, dataset D is a collection of
user data and the functionM corresponds to the output machine learning model parameters. We
note that this notion of differential privacy is also called global differential privacy.
Differential privacy for machine learning models can be obtained in four ways: input perturbation,
output perturbation, objective perturbation, and change in optimization algorithm.
In input perturbation, the dataset D is first modified using Laplace or Gaussian mechanism
and the resulting perturbed dataset is used to train the machine learning model [23]. In output
perturbation techniques, the machine learned model is trained completely and then the final model
is appropriately changed by using exponential mechanism [22, 11, 24, 16] or by adding Laplace or
Gaussian noise to the final model [25, 10, 12]. In objective perturbation techniques, the objective
function is perturbed by the appropriate scaling of Laplace or Gaussian noise and the machine
learning model is trained over perturbed objective function [10, 11, 26].
The fourth method modifies the optimization algorithm for training machine learning models.
This includes noisy SGD methods, which we discuss in the next section.
2.3 Noisy SGD methods
SGD and its variations such as momentum [27], Adagrad [28], or Adam [29] are used for training
machine learning models. These algorithms can be modified by adding noise to their gradients at
each iteration to provide differentially private machine learning algorithms. Even though noisy SGD
usually provides global differential privacy, recent works have shown that they can be combined with
cryptographic homomorphic encryption techniques to provide stronger privacy guarantees [30, 31].
Differentially private SGD algorithms is outlined in Figure 1. At each round of SGD, the
algorithm selects a subset of data. Using the current model and auxiliary parameters, it computes
gradients on each data point, and optionally modifies (e.g. clipping) the gradients. It then computes
the mean of the gradients, adds noise to the mean, and uses the noisy gradient to update the model.
The analysis of such algorithms can be broken into two parts:
• Obtain (′, δ′) differential privacy for each round of SGD, by ensuring that any information
from the dataset that is used to update the model parameters is differentially-private.
• Compute the total privacy cost of all SGD iterations to obtain overall (, δ) parameters.
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Figure 1: Outline of differentially private SGD algorithms. Parameters to the right of the privacy
barrier are differentially private.
We first consider the second part. Suppose we show that the noisy gradients sent from the
dataset to the server is (′, δ′)- differentially private. To keep track of accumulated privacy loss
over multiple iterations of SGD, a privacy accountant is used [32]. Privacy accountant maintains
accumulated privacy loss in terms of  and δ, which are determined by the composition theorem
used, ′, δ′ used in each iteration. For the Gaussian mechanism, [14] introduced moments accountant,
which provides tighter privacy bounds compared to other composition theorems [33, 34, 35, 34, 36].
Recently, [37, 38] proposed adaptive strategies to select privacy parameters ′, δ′ for each iteration.
The differentially private SGD algorithm terminates the training once the privacy budget is reached.
For the first part, recall that a common technique to provide privacy-preserving approximation
is to bound the sensitivity of the function and add Gaussian noise proportional to the sensitivity
bound. To this end, we need to bound the sensitivity of the gradients at each round of SGD. This
can be achieved in several ways.
If the loss function is differentiable (if not differentiable use sub-gradients) and Lipschitz bounded,
[16] bounds the gradient norm by the Lipschitz bound and use it to derive the sensitivity of gradients.
If the loss function derivative is bounded as a function of input (for example, in the logistic regression
case, one can bound the gradient norm by the maximum input norm possible) and hence derive
the sensitivity of gradients. If the loss function does not have known Lipschitz bound as in deep
learning applications, apriori bounds on gradient norm are difficult to derive. At each iteration of
training, [39] proposes to use public data to obtain an approximate bound on gradient norm and
clip the gradients at this approximate bound. However the availability of public data is a strong
assumption and [13, 14] clip the gradients without the availability of public data. We also assume
no access to public data.
At each iteration of training, [13] clips each coordinate of the stochastic gradient vector to
the range [−C,C]. [14] bounds the `2-norm of the stochastic gradient by clipping the gradient
`2-norm to a threshold C, where if the gradient `2-norm is more than C, each gradient entry is
scaled down by a factor of C divided by the `2-norm of the gradient. This ensures that the `2
sensitivity is bounded by C. Then the clipped gradients are averaged over the batch and noise
N (0, σ2C2I) is added to the average of the clipped gradients. The noisy clipped gradient mean is
used to update the model during this iteration and the noise scale σ determines the privacy cost of
this iteration. Since [13] clips each gradient entry and [14] clips the entire gradient norm, for same
clip thresholds, [13] incurs much more privacy loss compared to [14]. Recently, [40, 41] proposed
adaptive strategies to select the `2-norm threshold C. In contrast, our algorithm adaptively selects
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coordinate-wise clip thresholds.
3 Motivation for AdaCliP
The above set of noisy SGD methods raises several questions: is `2 clipping provably the best clipping
strategy? If so, how do we choose the clipping threshold C? Is there a systematic, theoretically
motivated, principled approach to obtain an optimal clipping strategy? For example, instead of
adding noise, if we whiten the gradients by dividing by the standard deviation and add noise, is
it better? We answer these questions, by deriving a theoretically motivated, principled clipping
strategy, which provably adds less noise compared to the previous methods. Before we proceed
further, we motivate AdaCliP by analyzing previous methods [16, 13, 14] on a simple regression
problem:
arg min
θ∈Rd
1
2n
n∑
i=1
‖θ − xi‖2, (1)
where xi ∈ Rd. The solution for this `22-regression problem is θ∗ = 1n
∑n
i=1 x
i. Let xi = (yiµ, 0, .., 0),
where n/2 values of yi are −1 and n/2 values are +1.
We now analyze the performance of differentially private SGD algorithms. At iteration t, the
gradient with respect to any example xit is gt = θt − xit . Notice that revealing the gradient gt and
xit , reveals the same information. Further observe that
E‖θt − xit‖2 = E‖θt‖2 + E‖xit‖2 ≥ E‖xit‖2 = µ2,
where the first equality follows by observing that Exit = 0. Since noise added is proportional to
the `2 norm of the vector revealed, it is beneficial to reveal xit . Consider the clip threshold C = µ.
Hence noise added is N (0, σ2µ2I), where σ is computed using privacy parameters , δ, and the
number of rounds. Therefore, `22-norm of added noise is σ2µ2d. Hence the signal to noise ratio
(SNR) (ratio of `22 norm of clipped gradient to that of noise added) is 1σ2d .
In this example, SNR gets worse with the size d of dimensions even though only one of the
dimensions contains information. Based on the definition of differential privacy, one need not add
much noise to dimensions other than the first one. This motivates us to adaptively add different
noise levels to different dimensions to minimize the `22-norm of the added noise. We note that the
above analysis can be easily modified to other techniques such as the Lipschitz bounded sensitivity
[16]. Further, it is easy to check that SNR stays the same in the above analysis for any clip threshold
less then µ and gets only worse if clip threshold is greater than µ.
4 Theoretical analysis
Before we present AdaCliP, we first state a general convergence result for SGD for non-convex
functions. For a statistic αˆ that serves as an estimate of parameter α, the bias of αˆ is defined as
bias(αˆ) ∆= ‖Eαˆ− α‖ and the variance of αˆ is defined as Var(αˆ) ∆= E‖αˆ− Eαˆ‖2. [42, Theorem 1] can
be modified to show the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let f(θ) = 1N
∑N
k=1 fk(θ). For a suitable choice of learning rate, iterates of SGD satisfy
1
T
T∑
t=1
E‖∇f(θt)‖2 ≤ c
T
√√√√ T∑
t=1
Var(gt) + c max
1≤t≤T
bias(gt),
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where gt is the stochastic gradient at time t and c is a constant.
Previous algorithms added noise to the gradients themselves. In a more general framework, one
can transform the gradient by a function, add noise, and apply the inverse of the function back.
This may reduce the variance and bias of differentially private gradients and by Lemma 2 yield
a better solution. We consider the class of element-wise linear transformations and find the best
transformation.
4.1 General framework
Let gt = (gt1, gt2, .., gtd) be the stochastic gradient vector at iteration t. Let at = (at1, at2, .., atd) and
bt = (bt1, bt2, .., btd) be the auxiliary vectors that will be described later. Transform gt by subtracting
at from it and dividing each dimension of gt − at by that of bt. Let wt = gt−atbt be the transformed
gradient i.e., wti =
gti−ati
bti
. To bound the sensitivity, the transformed gradient is clipped at norm 1.
Let the clipped transformed gradient be wˆt.
wˆt = clip(wt, 1) ∆= w
t
max(1, ‖wt‖2) .
We add noise N (0, σ2I) to the clipped transformed gradient wˆt. Let the noisy gradient be w˜t.
w˜t = wˆt +N t N t ∼ N (0, σ2I),
where σ is determined by the privacy parameters. Rescale w˜t to the same scale as original gradient
by multiplying each dimension of it with that of bt and adding at to resulting vector.
g˜t = btw˜t + at.
Finally, output g˜t as privacy-preserving approximation of gt.
Note that choices of at = (0, 0, ..., 0) and bt = (C,C, ...C) result in the algorithm of [14]. A
natural question is to ask is: what are the optimal choices of at and bt? By Lemma 2, observe
that we are interested in the variance and bias of the new gradient g˜t. By triangle inequality and
Jensen’s inequality,
bias(g˜t) ≤ bias(gt) + 2E‖g˜t − gt‖ and Var(g˜t) ≤ 3Var(gt) + 6E‖g˜t − gt‖2.
Hence, to find optimal values of at and bt we would like to bound E‖g˜t − gt‖2. A straightforward
calculation shows that the above quantity can be simplified to
E‖g˜t − gt‖2 = ‖gt − at‖2
(
1− 1max(1, ‖wt‖)
)2
+ ‖bt‖2σ2.
Thus there are two potential sources for gradient modification. The first term in the above equation
corresponds to the case when the transformed gradient wt might get clipped. The second term
corresponds to the Gaussian noise injected to the clipped gradient. Ideally, we would like to find
the best at and bt that minimize the above expression. However, it is difficult to analyze the effect
of clipping on the convergence. Hence we try to limit clipping, by assuming that
E‖wt‖2 ≤ γ
6
in analysis and try to minimize the injected Gaussian noise. Observe that E‖wt‖2 ≤ γ ensures
that ‖wt‖2 > 1 with constant probability (by Markov’s inequality) and hence wt gets clipped with
constant probability. Later in Theorem 2, we analyze the convergence of the proposed method by
using the above stated concentration bound. Therefore we limit the choices of at and bt such that
E‖wt‖2 ≤ γ and find the optimal at and bt that minimize the Gaussian noise. Interestingly, we show
that optimal at and bt is different than the traditional whitening choice. In Section 5, we propose
methods to approximate optimal at and bt using differentially private gradients.
Theorem 1. If E‖wt‖2 ≤ γ, the expected `2-norm of added noise i.e., ‖bt‖σ is minimized when
ati = mti
∆= Egti and bti =
√
sti
γ
·
√√√√ d∑
i=1
sti,
where sti
∆=
√
E(gti − Egti)2. Expected `22-norm of added noise is ∝ (
∑d
i=1 s
t
i)2/γ .
Proof. Observe that E‖wt‖2 can be rewritten as
E‖wt‖2 =
d∑
i=1
(sti)2 + (mti − ati)2
(bti)2
, (2)
From Equation 2, the condition E‖wt‖2 ≤ γ implies that ∑di=1 (sti)2+(mti−ati)2(bti)2 ≤ γ.
Further recall that added Gaussian vector is bt ·N and it’s expected `22-norm is σ2
∑d
i=1(bti)2.
Hence to minimize expected `22-norm of added noise, one should minimize
∑d
i=1(bti)2.
Hence it results in the optimization problem,
min
at,bt
d∑
i=1
(bti)2 s.t.
d∑
i=1
(sti)2 + (mti − ati)2
(bti)2
≤ γ.
Observe that by Holder’s inequality,(
d∑
i=1
(bti)2
)(
d∑
i=1
(sti)2
(bti)2
)
≥
(
d∑
i=1
sti
)2
(3)
and hence (
d∑
i=1
(bti)2
)
≥
(
d∑
i=1
sti
)2/( d∑
i=1
(sti)2
(bti)2
)
≥
(
d∑
i=1
sti
)2/
γ.
where last equation follows from constraint ∑di=1 (sti)2+(mti−ati)2(bti)2 ≤ γ. The last inequality is satisfied
with equality when bti =
√
sti/γ ·
√∑d
i=1 s
t
i. Further, combined with choice of ati = mti,
d∑
i=1
(sti)2 + (mti − ati)2
(bti)2
=
d∑
i=1
γ(sti)2
sti ·
∑d
i=1 s
t
i
= γ,
satisfying the constraint. Hence, the expected `22-norm of added noise is
σ2
d∑
i=1
(bti)2 = σ2
d∑
i=1
sti(
d∑
i=1
sti)/γ = σ2
(
d∑
i=1
sti
)2
/γ.
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Note that ati = mti and bti =
√
dsti/
√
γ leads to traditional whitening of gradient and ensures
that E‖wt‖2 = γ. Interestingly, the optimal choice for bt is different from the traditional whitening
choice. The classic whitening results in added noise with expected `22-norm of
σ2
d∑
i=1
(bti)2 = σ2
d∑
i=1
d(sti)2/γ = σ2d
d∑
i=1
(sti)2/γ.
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, d∑di=1(sti)2 ≥ (∑di=1 sti)2 , equality only when all sti are equal.
Hence, the proposed approach adds less noise compared to `2 clipping and whitened gradients in
most cases.
4.2 Convergence analysis
In this section, we present the convergence analysis for AdaCliP. Our main result is the convergence
of this algorithm for general nonconvex functions, the proof of which is provided in the Appendix A.
Theorem 2. Suppose the function f is L-Lipschitz smooth, ‖∇fk(θ)‖ ≤ G for all θ ∈ Rd and
k ∈ [N ], and Ek‖∇fk(θ) − ∇f(θ)‖2 ≤ σ2g for all θ ∈ Rd. Furthermore, suppose learning rate
ηt = η < 13L . Then, for the iterates of AdaCliP with batch size 1 and at = E[gt],
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[‖∇f(θt)‖2] ≤ 2[f(θ
0)− f(θ∗)]
ηT
+ 3Lησ2g︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stochastic gradient
variance
+ 6G
2
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
∥∥∥∥∥stbt
∥∥∥∥∥
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Clipping bias
+ Lησ
2
T
T−1∑
t=0
‖bt‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Noise-addition variance
,
where sti
∆=
√
E(gti − Egti)2.
Note the dependence of convergence result on the variance of stochastic gradients, bias introduced
due to clipping and variance due to noise addition. The terms of special interest to us are: clipping
bias and noise-addition variance. There is an inherent trade-off between these two terms as observed
through the dependence on bt. One can decrease the clipping bias by increasing ‖bt‖ but this comes
at the expense of larger noise addition. One can optimize the values of bt to minimize this upper
bound. In doing so, our choice of bt in Theorem 1 again becomes quite evident. In particular,
observe that clipping bias and noise-addition variance are the two terms in the LHS of Eq. (3).
Thus, by Holder’s inequality, their weighted sum is minimized when bt is chosen as per Theorem 1.
In the following section, we discuss choices of at and bt and their convergence bounds. In specific
we show how they affect the last term in Theorem 2.
4.3 Comparison on regression
We now revisit the regression problem shown in (1). Recall that in this example, all gradients have
the same norm and hence we can set clipping threshold to µ. Hence, the clipping bias is 0. With
this choice of the clipping threshold, we compare various choices of at and bt.
• [14] is equivalent to using choices ati = 0 and bti = µ. Hence, `22-norm of added noise is
σ2
∑d
i=1 µ
2 = dσ2µ2.
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• If we whiten the gradients, i.e., at = mt = Eθt and bti =
√
dsti =
√
d
√
E(gti − Egti)2. Specifically,
ati = 0 ∀i, bt1 =
√
dµ and bti = 0 ∀i > 1. 1 Hence, `22-norm of added noise is σ2dµ2, same as that
of [14].
• For the optimal choices i.e., at = mt and bti =
√
sti ·
√∑d
i=1 s
t
i. Specifically, ati = 0 ∀i, bt1 = µ and
bti = 0 ∀i > 1. Hence, `22-norm of added noise is σ2µ2, a factor of d less than that of [14] and
whitening.
5 AdaCliP
Algorithm 1 AdaCliP
1: Inputs: objective function f(θ) = 1N
∑N
k=1 fk(θ), learning rate ηt, batch size B, noise scale σ.
2: Initialize m0 = 0 · 1, s0 = √h1h2 · 1
3: Initialize θ0 randomly
4: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
5: for i = 1 to d do
6: bti =
√
sti ·
√∑d
i=1 s
t
i
7: end for
8: St ← B random users
9: for each k ∈ St do
10: Compute gradient: gt(k) = ∇fk(θt)
11: Privacy preserving noise addition: g˜t(k) = Noise-Addition(gt(k),mt, bt, σ)
12: end for
13: Compute average noisy gradient: g˜t = 1B
∑
k∈St g˜
t(k)
14: Update parameters: θt+1 = θt − ηtg˜t
15: Update mean and standard deviation using (4) and (5) respectively.
16: end for
17: Outputs: θT and compute the overall privacy cost (, δ) using a privacy accounting method
In this section, we present the optimal estimator based on the noisy differentially private version
of the gradients. First note that, to set the optimal values of at and bt, we need to know the
mean and variance of the gradients. We propose to estimate them using noisy differentially private
gradients. The full algorithm AdaCliP is presented in Algorithm 1.
AdaCliP minimizes the objective function f(θ) = 1N
∑
k fk(θ) preserving privacy under (, δ)-
differential privacy. At each iteration of SGD, AdaCliP selects a minibatch of B users. It then
computes the stochastic gradient corresponding to each user and adds noise to the stochastic gradient
with optimal choices for transformation vectors at and bt. Later AdaCliP updates the parameters
(mean and variance) using noisy gradients. Notice that here the Gaussian noise is added to each
individual user gradient separately instead of adding to the mean processed gradient as described
earlier. Since the sum of Gaussian noises is also Gaussian noise, adding Gaussian noise to the
individual user processed gradient and to the mean processed gradient is essentially equivalent.
AdaCliP also updates the mean and variance estimates of the gradients using the noisy gradients.
1Notice that to avoid definitions of 0/0, one can consider arbitrarily small variances in dimensions 2 to d. Our
observations hold even in that case.
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Figure 2: Regression error vs dimension size
Figure 3: Average noise per gradient vs  for
(, 10−5)-DP neural network
Mean estimate: Since there is no direct access to stochastic gradients at time t, mt is
approximated by exponential average of previous noisy gradients g˜t (momentum style approach)
mt = β1mt−1 + (1− β1)g˜t, (4)
where β1 is a decay parameter of the exponential moving average.
Variance estimate: For variance, we need to estimate E(gti−mti)2 and cannot be approximated
by a moving average of E(g˜ti −mti)2. We show that E(gti −mti)2 can be inferred from E(g˜ti −mti)2 as
follows by assuming that clipping does not take place i.e., g˜t = gt + btN t.
E(gti −mti)2 =E(g˜ti −mti)2 + E(btiN ti )2 + 2E(−btiN ti )(gti + btiN ti −mti)
=E(g˜ti −mti)2 − E(btiN ti )2 − 2E(btiN ti )(gti −mti)
=E(g˜ti −mti)2 − (bti)2σ2.
However, the above quantity can be quite noisy. Hence we ensure that the quantity is both upper
and lower bounded as follows:
(gti −mti)2 ≈ min(max((g˜ti −mti)2 − (bti)2σ2, h1), h2),
where h1 and h2 are small constants. We use an exponential moving average of the above quantity
to estimate the variance as
vt = min(max((g˜ti −mti)2 − (bti)2σ2, h1), h2),
(sti)2 = β2(st−1i )2 + (1− β2)vt. (5)
We observed that our algorithm is robust to parameters β1, β2, h1, and are thus, set to 0.99, 0.9,
10−12 in all our experiments. We only tune h2 in our experiments.
6 Experiments
We compare AdaCliP to previous methods over a synthetic example and models on MNIST and
show that AdaCliP obtains as much as 1.6% improvement in accuracy over previous methods for
neural networks. We first compare AdaCliP with [14] on `22-regression problem (1). Let x1, . . . , x1000
be such that each xi ∈ Rd and xi = (yi, 0, .., 0) where yi = 1 for i ≤ 500 and −1 otherwise. We
find θ that minimizes the sum of square of distances to xi. We run both AdaCliP and [14] using
clip threshold of 1.0 and noise scale σ = 0.1. We run for 10 epochs with mini batch size of 1 and
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Table 1: Accuracy (%) vs  for (, 10−5)-DP Logistic Regression
 0.1 0.25 0.5 1.0 2.0
(norm bound) 73.45 ± 0.23 79.18 ± 0.18 84.30 ± 0.13 88.02 ± 0.08 89.65 ± 0.04
(Abadi et al) 84.23 ± 0.15 87.81 ± 0.10 90.13 ± 0.08 90.74 ± 0.05 90.97 ± 0.03
AdaCliP 85.37 ± 0.19 88.11 ± 0.14 90.29 ± 0.11 90.87 ± 0.08 91.15 ± 0.05
Table 2: Accuracy (%) vs  for (, 10−5)-DP neural network
 0.2 0.5 1.0 2.0 4.0
(Abadi et al) 85.55 ± 0.20 90.23 ± 0.19 92.92 ± 0.18 94.96 ± 0.14 95.91 ± 0.12
AdaCliP 87.18 ± 0.24 91.26 ± 0.22 93.71 ± 0.20 95.56 ± 0.17 96.31 ± 0.13
learning rate of 0.01. Figure 2 shows that `22 regression error of [14] is much higher than that of
AdaCliP. Furthermore, as expected AdaCliP does not add noise to dimensions other than 1 and
hence its error remains independent of the number of dimensions.
We now compare AdaCliP to the previous methods on the MNIST dataset [43]. MNIST consists
60,000 training images and 10,000 test images. We divide each feature value by 255.0 to standardize
it to [0, 1]. We use mini batch size of 600 in all the experiments, fix δ = 10−5, and compare accuracy
values for different . We use moments account [14] to keep track of privacy loss, as it is known to
give tight privacy bounds for the Gaussian mechanism.
We first consider the logistic regression models. The `2 sensitivity of the gradient norm can be
bounded using the `2-norm of the inputs. We compare three methods: norm bound: adding the
Gaussian noise proportional to the sensitivity bound (the maximum `2-norm of the inputs which
is 28.0) to the gradients, [14], and AdaCliP. For [14], we clip the gradient norm at 4.0 (near the
median value of the gradient norm). The results are in Table 1. AdaCliP achieves better accuracy
than both [14] and norm bound. The accuracy gains for AdaCliP over [14] ranges from 0.2% at
 = 2.0 to 1.1% at  = 0.1.
We then consider a neural model similar to the one in [14]. 784 dimensional input is projected
to 60 dimensions using differentially private PCA and then a neural network with a single hidden
layer of 1000 units is trained on the 60 dimensional input. The privacy budget is split between PCA
and neural network training. As suggested in [14], for [14], we clip the gradient norm of each layer
at 4.0. Table 2 shows that AdaCliP consistently performs better than the previous methods. The
accuracy gains for AdaCliP over [14] ranges from 0.4% at  = 2.0 to 1.6% at  = 0.2.
We also compare the noise added to the gradients for AdaCliP and [14] for the neural model by
evaluating the average value of ||gt − g˜t||2, which is a combination of both clipping and additive
Gaussian noise. Figure 3 shows that AdaCliP consistently adds less noise than [14], which is
consistent with our theory. The ratio of noises is around 0.8 for all . Hence, AdaCliP achieves both
better accuracy and adds smaller amount of noise compared to the Euclidean clipping of [14].
7 Conclusion
We proposed AdaCliP, an (, δ)- differentially private SGD algorithm that adds smaller amount
of noise to the gradients during training. We compared our technique with previous methods on
MNIST dataset and demonstrated that we achieve higher accuracy for the same value of  and δ. It
would be interesting to see if instead of using a coordinate-wise gradient transform, using a matrix
or low rank matrix gradient transform would give better results.
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Appendix - AdaCliP: Adaptive Clipping for Private SGD
A AdaCliP Convergence Analysis
Theorem. Suppose the function f is L-Lipschitz smooth, ‖∇fk(θ)‖ ≤ G for all θ ∈ Rd and k ∈ [N ],
and Ek‖∇fk(θ)−∇f(θ)‖2 ≤ σ2g for all θ ∈ Rd. Furthermore, suppose η < 13L . Then, for the iterates
of AdaCliP with batch size 1 and at = E[gt], we have the following:
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[‖∇f(θt)‖2] ≤ 2[f(θ
0)− f(θ∗)]
ηT
+ 3Lησ2g︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stochastic Gradient
Variance
+ 6G
2
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
∥∥∥∥∥stbt
∥∥∥∥∥
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Clipping bias
+ Lησ
2
T
T−1∑
t=0
‖bt‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Noise-addition variance
,
where sti
∆=
√
E(gti − Egti)2.
Proof. Recall that the update is of the form
θt+1 = θt − η
[
gt − at
max{‖gt−atbt , 1‖}
+ btN t + at
]
.
For the ease of exposition, we define the following quantities:
ct = g
t − at
max{‖gt−atbt , 1‖}
,
∆t = ct − (gt − at).
We start with the bound following:
Ef(θt+1) ≤ f(θt) + E〈∇f(θt), θt+1 − θt〉+ L2E‖θt+1 − θ
t‖2
= f(θt)− ηE〈∇f(θt), ct + btN t + at〉+ Lη
2
2 E
∥∥∥ct + btN t + at∥∥∥2
= f(θt)− ηE〈∇f(θt), ct + at〉+ Lη
2
2 E
∥∥∥ct + at∥∥∥2 + Lη22 E[‖btN t‖2]
= f(θt)− ηE〈∇f(θt), ct + at〉+ Lη
2
2 E
∥∥∥ct + at∥∥∥2 + Lη2σ22 ‖bt‖2.
The first inequality follows from Lipschitz continuous nature of the gradient. The second equality
follows from the fact that E[N t] = 0 and N t is independent of gt and at. The last equality is due to
the fact that E[‖N ti ‖2] = σ2. Note that ct + at = ∆t + gt. Therefore, from the above inequality, we
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get
Ef(θt+1)
≤f(θt)− ηE〈∇f(θt), gt + ∆t〉+ Lη
2
2 E
∥∥∥gt + ∆t∥∥∥2 + Lη2σ22 ‖bt‖2
=f(θt)− η‖∇f(θt)‖2 − ηE〈∇f(θt),∆t〉+ Lη
2
2 E
∥∥∥gt −∇f(θt) +∇f(θt) + ∆t∥∥∥2 + Lη2σ22 ‖bt‖2
=f(θt)− η‖∇f(θt)‖2 + η‖∇f(θt)‖E‖∆t‖+ Lη
2
2 E
∥∥∥gt −∇f(θt) +∇f(θt) + ∆t∥∥∥2 + Lη2σ22 ‖bt‖2
≤f(θt)− η‖∇f(θt)‖2 + η‖∇f(θt)‖E‖∆t‖+ 3Lη
2
2
[
E
∥∥∥gt −∇f(θt)∥∥∥2 + E‖∇f(θt)‖2 + E‖∆t‖2]
+ Lη
2σ2
2 ‖b
t‖2. (6)
The last inequality follows from the fact that ‖v1 + v2 + v3‖2 ≤ 3(‖v1‖2 + ‖v2‖2 + ‖v3‖2). Using
Lemma 3, we have the following bound on ‖∇f(θt)‖E‖∆t‖ and E‖∆t‖2:
‖∇f(θt)‖E‖∆t‖ ≤ GP (‖∆t‖ > 0)E
[
‖∆t‖
∣∣∣‖∆t‖ > 0] ≤ 2G2 ∥∥∥∥∥stbt
∥∥∥∥∥
2
E‖∆t‖2 ≤ P (‖∆t‖ > 0)E
[
‖∆t‖2
∣∣∣‖∆t‖ > 0] ≤ 2G2 ∥∥∥∥∥stbt
∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
The second inequality uses the fact that ‖∆t‖2 ≤ 2G2. Plugging in these bounds into Equation (6),
we get
Ef(θt+1) ≤ f(θt)−
(
η − 3Lη
2
2
)
‖∇f(θt)‖2 + 2G2
(
η + 3Lη
2
2
)∥∥∥∥∥stbt
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
3Lη2σ2g
2 +
Lη2σ2
2 ‖b
t‖2
≤ f(θt)− η2‖∇f(θ
t)‖2 + 2G2
(
η + 3Lη
2
2
)∥∥∥∥∥stbt
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
3Lη2σ2g
2 +
Lη2σ2
2 ‖b
t‖2.
Adding the above inequalities from t = 0 to T − 1 and by using telescoping sum, we get
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[‖∇f(θt)‖2] ≤ 2[f(θ
0)− f(θT )]
ηT
+ 3Lησ2g +
6G2
T
T−1∑
t=0
∥∥∥∥∥stbt
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+ Lησ
2
T
T−1∑
t=0
‖bt‖2.
Here, we used the condition η < 13L . The desired result is obtained by using the fact that
f(θT ) ≥ f(θ∗).
Lemma 3. Let st be such that sti = E[(gti −∇[f(θt)]i)2]. If at = E[gt] then ∆t > 0 with at most
probability min{1, ‖ stbt ‖2}.
Proof. We first observe that ∆t = 0 when ‖gt − at‖ ≤ ‖bt‖. Thus, we essentially have to bound the
probability that ‖gt − at‖ ≥ ‖bt‖. This follows from a simple application of Chebyshev’s inequality:
P
∥∥∥∥∥gt − E[gt]st btst
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≥ 1
 ≤ ∥∥∥∥∥stbt
∥∥∥∥∥
2
,
which gives us the desired result.
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(a) Convergence for  = 0.5, δ = 10−5. (b) Accuracy vs  for δ = 10−5.
Figure 4: Comparison of SGD with various momentum factors
B Comparison of SGD with momentum
One can ask if we can obtain benefits similar to AdaCliP by simply using momentum. We provide
an intuitive reasoning why this may not be the case. Momentum maintains accumulation vector νt
that keeps track of exponentially weighted averages of previous gradients.
νt = βνt−1 + (1− β)gt,
θt = θt−1 − ηνt,
where β is the momentum parameter. Notice that since νt is an exponentially weighted average of
previous gradients, it can also be expressed as
νt = (1− β)
t∑
i=0
βt−igt
When instead of original gradients, privacy-preserving approximations g˜t are used in optimization,
notice that even independent Gaussian noises added over several steps get exponentially averaged.
Assuming same noise scale σ is used over all iterations, it can be shown that
νt = (1− β)
t∑
i=0
βt−ig˜t
= (1− β)
t∑
i=0
βt−igt + (1− β)
t∑
i=0
βt−iN t
≈ (1− β)
t∑
i=0
βt−igt +N (0, (1− β)/(1 + β)σ2I).
Notice that noise added per update is factor
√
1−β
1+β smaller than that in SGD. This might lead one
to believe that deferentially private momentum optimization might reach better model parameters
compared to vanilla SGD.
To evaluate this, consider the logistic regression task on MNIST in Section 6. To avoid clipping,
we add noise proportional to maximum gradient norm i.e., 28. In Figure 4(a), we aim for (0.5, 10−5)-
differential privacy. Figures 4(b) and 4(a) show that SGD and momentum with various momentum
factors (β) converge to almost similar accuracies.
We hypothesize that this behavior is due to the fact that under momentum, noises added across
iterations are dependent. Hence, even though the noise added per iteration is small, overall noise
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added to sum of all gradients is the same for both SGD and momentum. For SGD, the total amount
of noise added is ∑Tt=0N t. Observe that the same holds for momentum as
T∑
t=0
νt =
T∑
t=0
(1− β)
t∑
i=0
βt−ig˜t
=
T∑
t=0
[
(1− β)
t∑
i=0
βt−igt + (1− β)
t∑
i=0
βt−iN t
]
≈
T∑
t=0
[
(1− β)
t∑
i=0
βt−igt +N t
]
.
It would be interesting to provide better theoretical understanding for this behavior.
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